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ABSTRACT
Until its sales of a product materialize, a firm is a "pre-producer" in the market for that product. That
firm may may be a new start-up, or it may already sell other products. Firms that do not succeed in
generating sales eventually become discouraged and move on to other activities. When this fate
befalls a lot of firms, as it recently did in several IT-related businesses, the industry experiences a
"shakeout." In the model that I will present, during the shakeout some firms switch to flatter, safer
earnings. This switch raises earnings at the time of the shakeout but lowers them in the long run, and
it therefore raises earnings-price ratios. This has happened on the Nasdaq since March, 2000 when











Until its sales of a product materialize, a ﬁrm is a “pre-producer” in the
market for that product. That ﬁrm may may be a new start-up, or it may
already sell other products. Firms that do not succeed in generating sales
eventually become discouraged and move on to other activities. When this
fate befalls a lot of ﬁrms, as it recently did in several IT-related businesses,
the indistry experiences a “shakeout.” In the model that I will present, during
the shakeout some ﬁrms switch to ﬂatter, safer earnings. This switch raises
earnings at the time of the shakeout but lowers them in the long run, and it
therefore raises earnings-price ratios. This has happened on the Nasdaq since
March, 2000 when the Nasdaq shakeout began.
1 Introduction
Since March of 2000, a wave of e-commerce and computer companies have folded.
Several years after their founding, many had not managed to sell anything. And
at the tail end of the 19th century some 90% of the hundreds of automobile pre-
producers never sold a single car — the median pre-production time was less than a
year but some were at it for more than 10 years (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
Pre-producers predominate in new industries. It is new industries, where com-
mercial success is risky and delayed, and where market share is up for grabs, that
show most volatility in stock-price indexes (Mazzucato 2002). This paper will link
these facts with a simple model.
In the model, a pre-producer of a product is born when a ﬁrm starts devoting re-
sources to that product market or diverting them from its activities in other markets.
Pre-production ends when sales start coming in. The waiting time until sales start
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1is a random variable, drawn independently by ﬁrms from the same distribution. The
main results are
1. Firms that remain pre-producers eventually become discouraged and move on
to other activities — a “shakeout.”
2. The shakeout is when ﬁrms opt for ﬂatter, safer income streams. This switch
raises earnings at the time of the shakeout but lowers them in the long run, and
it therefore raises earnings-price ratios. This is indeed what has happened on
the Nasdaq since March, 2000 when the shakeout began.
By waiting for sales to materialize, a pre-producer creates value — a form of or-
ganization capital. As the industry matures and as the product price declines, that
capital gradually loses its value. The implications for stock prices depend in part on
whether pre-producers are mainly new ﬁrms, or lateral entrants that own capacity in
other industries. On the other hand, the mix of de novo and de alio capital has no
bearing on the industry price, quantity and on the size of the shakeout.
2E v i d e n c e
First we shall review evidence on pre-production, a period during which ﬁrms wait
for their sales to materialize, and during which some ﬁrms succeed ahead of others.
Section 2.1 reports evidence on this. The implications for the stock market hinge
on there being lateral entry and on ﬁrms being able to re-focus their activities when
faced with declining markets. Section 2.2 will report evidence on that.
2.1 Pre-production
The model dichotomizes a ﬁrm’s life-cycle experience into a “start-up” and a “matu-
rity” phase, and ignores all intermediate stages. This gets some support from several
sources. In the pharmaceutical industry the fortune of a new ﬁrm is tied to whether
its patented drug will be approved — the average time from a drug’s ﬁrst worldwide
patent application to its approval by the FDA is 13 years (Dranove and Meltzer 1994).
Elsewhere the lag is shorter: Carroll and Hannan (2000) report evidence on automo-
bile and beer pre-producers where the pre-production period was closer to a year.
Related evidence on time to build (Koeva 2002) and on patent-gestation lags (Pakes
and Schankerman 1984) puts the lag (which in this case has a diﬀerent meaning) at
about 2 years.
These are estimates of average waiting times. Next I shall show evidence that






Figure 1: Success and failure hazards in data analyzed by Guler (2002)
2.1.1 Venture-capital backed companies
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 reports the success and failure hazards for a sample of 1355
VC held ﬁrms. The companies were founded between 1989 and 1993, and the period
of coverage extends to 2001. Guler (2002) compiled the data from the VentureExpert
d a t a b a s e .AV C ’ sg o a li st ou n l o a dt h eﬁrm via an IPO or an acquisition; hence the
solid line in the left panel represents successes from the VC’s viewpoint. I interpret
IPO or merger to reﬂect news of the ﬁrm’s commercial viability; it then has a meaning
similar to the revenue hazard reported in Figure 2.
Guler (2002) reports hazards in which the horizontal axis reports not calendar
time, but investment rounds so that in that case “time” begins with the ﬁrst invest-
ment round. The hazards look quite similar to the ones I report here. Therefore the
essential properties of these hazards do not arise because ﬁrm founding is a noisy
measure of when the ﬁrm really gets started. These data show the success hazard
peaking between years 6 and 9, and with the termination hazard peaking between
years 7 and 11.
Other, similar data provide information about a company’s status at the time
of VC investment in it. Gompers and Lerner (1999, table 5.2) report that in their
sample the median company age was 3 years. Of these, only 53% had sales and only
7.6% were proﬁtable. Thus it would seem that it takes the median ﬁrm about 3
years to generate sales. Kaplan and Str˙ omberg (2003) report that about half of the





Peaks at 2.5 years
Figure 2: Schoonhoven’s evidence on semi-conductor firms
sales.
2.1.2 The revenue hazard
Schoonhoven et al. (1990) report a bell-shaped hazard that peaks at 2.5 years. The
hazard is actually a 12-month moving average of the hazards, the smoothing was
needed because the sample was relatively small. The ﬁrms are 98 U.S. semi-conductor
pre-producers, founded between 1978 and 1993. Of these, 89 had managed to ship
their ﬁrst product before the data were collected. The horizontal axis measures time
in months. There is variance in the waiting times, though less than we see in the VC
data.
2.1.3 Firm age and sales
Since pre-production is deﬁned by the absence of sales, let us look at some evidence
on how a ﬁrm age relates to its sales. Most work with plant-level and ﬁrm-level data
from the U.S. uses employment or assets to measure ﬁrm size, e.g., Evans (1987).
But pre-producers typically do own assets and employ workers — it is sales that they
do not have.
Figure 3 presents plots for monthly sales as a function of the ﬁrm’s age measured
in months. The data contain the ﬁnancial accounts for more than 190,000 Spanish
4Figure 3: Monthly Sales and Sales/Employment ratio, in millions of
1995 Euros.
5ﬁrms for the period 1989-2001.1 The plots pool ﬁrms from diﬀerent cohorts.
T h es a m p l ee x c l u d e sm a n yp r e - p r o d u c e r sb e c a u s eﬁr m sm u s th a v es o m es a l e st o
be included in it. Therefore the median and the mean are both biased up in the
early months. Yet both sets of curves show a convex portion in the ﬁr s ty e a ro rs o ,
indicating the presence of an initial low-sales epoch. Figure 3 also shows that mean
size exceeds median size by a factor of three or more, a symptom of heterogeneity.
2.2 Lateral entry and re-deﬁnition
In the early automobile industry, of 2197 entrants about one third were de alio
(Carroll et al (1996). Some had been carriage producers (e.g., Studebaker), some
steam-engine producers (e.g., Oldsmobile), or precision-metal producers (Leland and
Faulconer — later Cadillac — and the Dodge Brothers). Then in the 20s, during the
shakeout, many automakers switched to making bicycles. In the early TV industry,
26 percent of the entrants were radio producers (Klepper 2004, Table 2). And in the
early disk-drive industry, about 75 percent of entrants were de alio (Khessina and
Carroll, 2004).
One way in which de-alio capital enters a new industry is through merger or
acquisition. Gort (1962) showed that the target is more likely to be in an expanding
i n d u s t r ya n da na c q u i r e ri sm o r el i k e l yt ob e in a declining industry. Gort, Grabowski
and McGuckin (1985) later reﬁned this argument, focusing on the role of management.
They argue that a management team is for various reasons indivisible, and when it
experiences “slack”, it may try to take over another company and manage it. A pre-
production eﬀort, when abandoned, can induce the ﬁrm to move its organizational
skills to an area where it will draw higher returns.
An example of a company that has re-deﬁned itself is IBM. Table 1 compares
the distribution of revenue that IBM reported in its 10Q ﬁling with the SEC for the
second quarter of 2004 with that for the second quarter of 1994:
2Q ‘94 2Q ‘04
Product type $ bil. % $ bil. %
Hardware 7.7 .50 7.4 .32
Software 2.7 .18 3.5 .15
Services+Maintenance 3.9 .25 11.3 .49
Rentals & Financing .8 .05 0.9 .04
Total 15.4 100 23.2 100
Table 1 : IBM’s earnings in 2004 vs. 1994
1The Database is Sabe (Sistema de análisis de balances españoles). The variables used are: Total
sales (variable #727), and the total number of employees (#94). Sales were deﬂated bythe Deﬂator
for Total Domestic Demand (taken from OECD’s Economic Outlook).
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Figure 4: Type-z firm’s otput as a function of its age
The computer market has operated on small margins and producers have been moving
to other markets, with IBM moving to international business consulting so that it is
now a service company more than a manufacturing one.
Less dramatically, Apple too is re-focusing; its 10K ﬁling with the SEC reveals
that between 2001 and 2003 its annual net sales of peripherals and other hardware
rose $671 million, most of which was because of the rise in Ipod sales, and not of
Apple PCs.
3M o d e l
Consider an industry in which a ﬁxed inverse-demand curve p = D(q). The Appendix
studies the case in which D(·) also depends on calendar time. Firms are inﬁnitessimal
and risk neutral, and face an interest rate of r which is exogenous.
The age-productivity proﬁle of a ﬁrm.–Conditional on its age, t,a n di t st y p e ,z,




1 if t ≥ z.
It is plotted in Figure 4. We can think of it as a learning curve. It is a random
function because z is a random variable.
The industry age-productivity proﬁle.–Ex-ante, ﬁr m sa r et h es a m ei nt h a te a c h
believes itself to be a random draw from the distribution F (z). The realized z’s are
uncorrelated. There is no aggregate uncertainty, so that (until exit starts) actual
output per ﬁrm is also the expected output of each ﬁrm is
Z ∞
0
Yt (z)dF (z)=F (t)
7and F is exogenous. In a new industry that uses a new technology, many designs and
techniques may look equally promising ex-ante. The waiting times, z,d i ﬀer over ﬁrms
perhaps because each uses a slightly diﬀerent technique. All the gains in productivity
come from the “extensive margin” whereby a pre-producer becomes a producer.
Evolution of output.–Output, q, equals the number of producers. Everyone enters
as a pre-producer. Let us impose a unit maximal capacity on each ﬁrm. Let k denote
the number of ﬁrms, and the total potential capacity of all the pre-producers. Then
if no capacity is withdrawn from the industry kt − q is the number of pre-producers





Thus the diﬀerential equation for q is
˙ q =( k − q)h.
Since the equilibrium price in the industry cannot rise, all entry will occur at date
zero.
Exit.–Alternative earnings are r per unit of capacity per unit of time.3 They will
induce some pre-producers to exit if staying in the industry oﬀers prospects that are
suﬃciently bleak.
The values of ﬁrms.–It will turn out that pt ≥ r for all t, so that producers never








For keep things simple, I assume physical depreciation to be zero everywhere. Then
as long as V ≥ r/r =1 , a pre-producer is happy to stay in the industry.
As we shall see, every remaining pre-producer will exit on the same date. Let T






















2When no confusion is likely, I shall use subscripts to denote arguments of various functions. So
instead of F (t) and p(t) f o re x a m p l e ,Is h a l lw r i t eFt and pt.
3T h e r e f o r ew ea r ea s s u m i n gthat capital is general. If capital were purely speciﬁc, its salvage
value would be zero and we would not see any exit of pre-producers. The truth is somewhere in
between, but to keep things simple I shall deal only with the extreme case of general capital.
4This is because the value of of exit is unity, and because Bayes’ rule gives
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Figure 5: The shape assumed for h(z)




0 for z<t 0
G(z − t0) for z ≥ t0




0 for z<t 0
g(z−t0)
1−G(z−t0) for z ≥ t0,
as shown in Figure 5. To avoid tedious references to corners, let us assume that
Gt < 1 for all t<∞ so that h(z) > 0 for all z. The shape assumed for h is a
compromise between the reality of Figures 1 and 2, and tractability. The Appendix
T h eA p p e n d i xs t u d i e st h ec a s ei nw h i c hF is general.
Equilibrium.–With F thus restricted, the nature of equilibrium is easily deduced.
All pre-producers, k of them, enter at date zero. Output then equals kFt, and pt then
equals D(kFt) f o ra sl o n ga sn oe x i tt a k e sp l a c e . A f t e rd a t et0,t h ep r o s p e c t so f
pre-producers get steadily dimmer because both pt and ht are declining. If any exit
does take place, it all occurs at a single date, T, when the remaining pre-producers
all exit. Output and price stabilize and there are no further dynamics.
For that to be true, however, two other conditions must be met:
1. While the value of entry is zero at date zero,





























92. While pre-producers are indiﬀerent between exiting at T and remaining in the
industry,
VT =1 , (2)
They must strictly prefer to remain in the industry before that, i.e., Vt > 1 for
t ∈ (0,T).
In fact, both conditions are met. The ﬁrst is met because (i) the transition from
pre-production to production depends on the ﬁrm’s own age s−t alone, and because
(ii) the equilibrium price declines with time, so that nothing is gained by delaying
entry. The second is met because — as I shall show below — the value of pre-producers
rises at the rate r until date t0 after which time it monotonically declines.
Analysis.–The unknowns are k,a n dT. Denote the solution in (1) for V0 by
V0 = V0 (k).
Since pt = D(kFt), V 0
0 (k) ≤ 0. The corner conditions will be explained diagram-



















hT = r. (3)
Condition (3) is derived on the presumption that ˙ pT =0 , which must be true if every
other pre-producer exits exactly at T in which case pt = pT for all t ≥ T.I ss a y st h a t
foregone earnings must equal the expected discounted gains from waiting another








Again, the corner conditions will follow. From (4) we see that in the limit the industry
price falls to a level that includes a markup that compensates the pre-producers for
staying in the race and foregoing the income r.
We also know, however, that since no exit takes place before T,
pT = D(kFT). (5)

















Figure 6: Restrictions implied by (1) and (2).














T = T (k)
solve (6) for T.T h i si st h eo p t i m a le x i tr e l a t i o nt h a ts a t i s ﬁes T0 (k) < 0. The functions
V0 (k) and T (k) are drawn in Figure 6. The value k∗ is the equilibrium number of




for k.T h i si st h en u m b e ro fﬁrms that would just break even if they had to remain
in the industry for ever.
Conditions under which exit occurs.–When t0 is large or when demand is highly
inelastic, it will turn out that equilibrium will have so few ﬁrms entering that price
will never decline so much that any of them will ever wish to exit.




11Proof. This proof refers to the second panel in Figure 6. (i) If:S i n c ek∗ lies to
the right of k∞,w eh a v eT (k∗) < ∞. (ii) Only if:N o wk∗ i st ot h el e f to fk∞ which
means that T (k∗)=∞.















r for all t. The latter is guaranteed is (8) fails. (ii) If:W h e n






for some ﬁnite t. Therefore V0 (k∞) > 1 which, from the left panel in Figure 6 implies
that k∗ >k ∞. But then the right panel implies that T (k∗) < ∞.
The age-sales relation.–Looking back at Figure 3, what does the model imply for
the two lines? The dashed line is mean sales. Expected sales conditional on ﬁrm age
are zero for t<t 0,f o l l o w e db y
E (sales | age = t)=
½
FtD(kFt) for t ∈ [t0,T),
FTD(kFT)+( 1− FT)r for t ≥ T.
If demand is elastic, a ﬁrm’s expected sales rise gradually as of date t0, then jump
further up at date T, and then remain constant. If demand is inelastic, expected
sales jump at date t0, then gradually decline until date T, and then again jump up
at date T. On the other hand, median sales should be zero until the date at which
Ft =1 /2, and they then should equal D(kFt) and therefore be declining. Here the
model is handicapped by the sample which excludes ﬁrms that have no sales. If such
ﬁrms were included, the median would have been closer to zero in the early months.
The model does, at least, generate the S shape for the two lines which seems to be
present in all the ﬁve panels of Figure 3.
4 Earnings and the value of capital
De alio capital matters for stock prices in a new industry. It is also important in
fact. Let K be the capacity that the ﬁrms in question hold in other industries where
it draws a return of r.M o r e o v e r ,l e tδ denote the fraction of k that is introduced by
de alio entrants, and 1 − δ the fraction held by de novo entrants. In what follows
I suppose that (8) fails so that T<∞.I nt h a tc a s e(1 − FT)k units of capital are
withdrawn to other uses, but a fraction δ of this capacity remains in the hands of




rK + ptqt for t<T,
rK + pTqT + δrk(1 − FT) for t ≥ T.
12If demand is elastic, dividends rise continuously until date T when they jump up.T h e
nominal share of IT has risen from under two percent in 1980 to over six percent today,
while the price of IT-related products have fallen rapidly. Therefore the demand is
elastic and the IT-counterpart of pq has risen steadily. In what follows I shall therefore
assume that demand is elastic.5
Value of assets.–Since VT =1and since V ∗
T = pT/r, the total value of all assets
of the ﬁrms is
Mt ≡
½
K + k(FtV ∗





r + δ[1 − FT]
¢
for t ≥ T.
It too should be rising but, in contrast to earnings, M cap has a negative jump at T,
as the de-listing ﬁrms remove (1 − δ)(1− FT)k capital value from the total owned
by.
The ratio Et/Mt.–Since earnings rise monotonically to their eventual plateau
of rK + pTqT + δrk(1 − FT), and since market value anticipates this, the ratio of
earnings to market cap should rise st e a d i l yf r o mz e r ot oah i g ha td a t eT.A td a t eT
the ratio should jump to its highest level and remain there.
Measurement.–To illustrate how the model can be applied, let us imagine the
ﬁrms in the Nasdaq as all competing in one market, and call that the market for
“IT” for short. Then k is the capital they devote to IT, and K the capital they
devote to other, stable markets in which they draw earnings of rK.T h i s g r o s s l y
simpliﬁes things, in that (i) the activities of the Nasdaq are quite diverse and (ii)
many Nasdaq ﬁrms compete with ﬁrms listed on the NYSE — e.g., IBM which we
mentioned in Section 2.2. The fact is, however, that most of the Nasdaq’s subindexes
have moved together over the past decade, and that they have moved much more
than the NYSE index. I shall measure M as the stock-market capitalization plus the
market value of debt of the Nasdaq ﬁrms, deﬂated by the CPI, and I shall refer to
M as “capitalization” for short. This will give us the real value of the capital stock
owned by stock holders and the debt holders of ﬁrms traded on the Nasdaq. Earnings,
Et,a r ea l s od e ﬂated by the CPI.6 The results are plotted in Figure 7. The left panel
shows that capitalization fell between end-1999 and end-2000, whereas earnings rose
substantially. The right-hand panel shows that the ratio has risen substantially since
1999.
Stock-price indexes.–The model has no aggregate shocks, and so it predicts that
t h er e t u r no nt h em a r k e tp o r t f o l i om u s te q u a lr. Since producers’ dividends are pt,
5Evidence from Chun and Mun (2004) has it that the elasticity of demand is 0.5−0.9 but these
results are at the three-digit industry level. They attribute to industry-output expansion what, for
o u rp u r p o s e s ,i sam o v e m e n ta l o n gad e m a n dc u r v e .
6The data are from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Database. In terms of the subnumbers,
the construction of the variables is as follows:
M = (24)x(25) + (9) + (34) and E = (53)x(54)














































Figure 7: Mt and Et (left panel) and Et/Mt (right panel).
arbitrage requires that capital gains of producers satisfy
˙ V ∗
V ∗ = r −
p
V ∗ ≤ 0.
For t ∈ [t0,T), the inequality is strict because ˙ pt < 0 implies V ∗
t <p t/r.A sf o rp r e -
producers, let us assume that in the event of exit, shareholders can recover the full
value of the pre-producer’s assets, i.e., 1.T h e nVt is also the pre-producer’s market









The model implies that after the shakeout, when dividends rise, stock-price appre-
ciation should fall. While it cannot explain the abnormally high cumulative returns
on the Nasdaq in the late 90’s and the low cumulative returns since 2000, the model
explains why there was more appreciation before 2000 and less since.
5 Example: A constant hazard
Suppose that Ft =0for t<t 0 and that
Ft =1− e




Since D(kFt)Ft = A
k, k∞ solves A
k
R ∞
t0 e−rtdt =1 , so that k∞ = e−rt0 A
r . Therefore
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Figure 8: Pre-producers and producers in the constant-hazard case
w h i c hm u s tb em e tf o rt h e r ea te x i s te x i ta ts o m ed a t eT.
For t0 <t<T,q t = k
¡
1 − e−λ(t−t0)¢


























These are two equations in the unknowns (k,T). The time path of producers and
pre-producers is shown in the left panel of Figure 8, and the price path in the right
panel.The rising solid line is the number of producers and also the relation between
age and a ﬁrm’s expected output until date T.Aﬁrm’s expected sales, however, are
zero before t0, and after that they are ptFt = A
k, a constant, until date T when they




r. This is the counterpart of the relations plotted in
Figure 3.
Aggregate earnings are zero for t<t 0, A for t ∈ [t0,T), and A + ke−λ(T−t0)r
thereafter. Now let us simulate the example’s implications for the series plotted in
Figure 7. Because demand is unit elastic earnings are constant at A =1 0 .T h e
parameters satisfy (9) and they were chosen so as to exaggerate the impact of the
shakeout at T on E. The impact is large when a lot of pre-producers are still left
at T so that the shakeout is large. The left panel shows capitalization rising until
t h es h a k e o u td a t eo fT =6and that, also as in the data, capitalization drops and
earnings rise at that date.
















































Figure 9: Simulation of Et,M t and Et/Mt with A =1 0 ,λ= .02,r= .1, t0 =1 ,
K =1and δ = .05.
6 Literature review
In the model a ﬁrm has the option to engage in other activities should its activities
in the industry at hand turn out to be a failure. The value of that outside option is
unity. The ﬁrm therefore likes uncertainty about future proﬁtability in the industry.
As in Pastor and Veronesi (2004), ﬁnd that uncertainty was especially high in the
late 1990s. They calibrate a stock valuation model that includes this uncertainty, and
show that the uncertainty needed to match the observed Nasdaq valuations at their
peak is high but plausible. My model puts a diﬀerent structure on the uncertainty,
and focuses on the transition from pre-production to production, thereby pointing to
ad i ﬀerent set of facts — facts we reviewed in Section 2. Moreover, I focus on industry
equilibrium and industry life cycle so that a ﬁrm’s dividends depend on industry-wide
forces.
A form of pre-production occurs in the Mortensen-Pissarides type of model in
w h i c ha nu n ﬁlled vacancy can be viewed as a pre-producing ﬁrm. Pissarides (2000,
ch. 1.7) shows that after a favorable shock, many vacancies come in. But then the
falling u/v ratio plays the role that falling pt does here, and if exit of a vacancy
were allowed, one would expect to see it: Unless it manages to ﬁnd a worker early,
the vacant ﬁrm will get discouraged and “exit.” That model has the advantage of
endogenizing the hazard rate through movements in vacancies and unemployment.
The model relates to the patent-race literature (Loury 1980) except that instead
of winner-take-all, I impose market sharing by limiting the capacity of ﬁrms, so that
even the latecomers get revenue. These models also endogenize the hazard via the
patent racer’s research decision.
The model treats the length of the pre-production period as exogenous. Jovanovic
16and Rousseau (2001) and Pastor and Veronesi (forthcoming) endogenize the timing
of when production begins. These papers try to explain when IPOs occur and why
they bunch.
The parameter z reveals itself to pre-producers in much the same way as the ﬁrm’s
eﬃciency revealed itself to ﬁrms in the model in Jovanovic (1982). In that model,
the closest thing to pre-producers are the low-output ﬁrms which have unusually high
production costs. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) have a pre-production period and
a constant production hazard; their main focus is the shakeout in the tire industry
in the 1920s.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has explored the role that pre-production can play in the life cycle behavior
of an industry’s output, product price, and the market valuations of its producers.
We have seen that the model explains some features of the Nasdaq over the past
three decades. A part of the price run-up could have been caused by the prospect
of receiving dividends later, after the pre-production period. The rise in earnings
that was, in 2000, accompanied by a fall in capitalization is partly explained by ﬁrms
switching to ﬂatter and safer earnings streams.
The results should be of more general interest. The paper shows how a particular
form of organization capital should be valued. Our economic world is becoming more
Schumpeterian. Product lifetimes are now shorter and ﬁrms must constantly refocus
or be forced out by new ﬁrms which, when we ﬁrst encounter them, are pre-producers.
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8 Appendix: Existence of equilibrium in the gen-
eral case
Here I allow for a general F and for a time-varying D(·).T i m ei sd i s c r e t ef o rt e c h n i c a l
reasons. Let p = Dt (q) where D is continuous and uniformly bounded. Let F be a
CDF over the positive integers. Let N be the measure of all ﬁrms. I shall assume
that N is large enough that is ever all were to enter the industry at hand, the present
value of entry would be negative. I shall be more speciﬁcb e l o w .
States and actions.–The ﬁrm’s state is s =( σ,α), where σ is its production status
(σ =1f o rﬁrms outside the industry, = 2 for pre-producers, = 3 for producers), and
where α is its age, measured as the time elapsed since the ﬁrm entered the industry.
This variable is normalized to −1 for ﬁrms for which σ =1in the previous period.
Calendar time t ∈ I+ we shall keep track of separately. The individual-ﬁrm’s state
space then is S = {{1,2,3}×I+}. The action a =1means that the ﬁrm will spend
the next period outside the industry, and a =2means it will spend it in the industry.
Thus the set of actions is the pair A = {1,2}.
Payoﬀs.–Let MB denote the set of Borel measures over the generic set B.T h e
population distribution over states and actions will be denoted by τt ∈ MS×A.A
ﬁrm can inﬂuence its state only in the next period. Since a state transition does
not entail a direct cost, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ, ut depends only on (s,τt). Speciﬁcally,
qt =
R










Individual-ﬁrm state transitions.–This is a map from states and actions into
measures over states G : S × A → MS. I shall describe G(·;s,a) only in words.8 (i)
7In discrete time, the present value of r/(1 + r) is 1. This ensures that Tobin’s Q remains at
unity.
8In Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988), G could depend directly on τ. In the present model, the
states and actions of other players do not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s transition among states.
19Firms in the industry:I faα-aged ﬁrm with σ =2plays a =2 ,i tt r a n s i t st oσ =3
with probability (Fα+1 − Fα)/(1 − Fα), and its age becomes α +1 .I f , i n s t e a d , i t
plays a =1 ,i t sσ becomes unity. Re-entry is allowed, but as a newborn with α =0 .
Thus the set of feasible actions is the same for all players.9 (ii) Firms out of the
industry:A ﬁrm with σ =1stays there with probability 1 if it plays a =1 ,a n d
enters the industry with probability 1 if it plays a =2 .




Bellman equation.–Let τ ∈ M∞
S×A be the inﬁnite sequence (τt)
∞
0 .F i r m sk n o wτ
and take it as given — they have perfect foresight about the aggregates. The Bellman
equation is












Let τt,S denote the marginal of τt over S.
Deﬁnition of equilibrium.–Given the initial condition µ0, τ ∈ M∞
S×A is an equi-
librium if
τ0,S = µ0,a n d τt+1,S =
Z
G(·;s,a)dτt for t =0 ,1,..., (12)
and if for all t and all ˜ a ∈ A,
τt
µ½










Condition (12) states that the transitions hold, and condition (13) states that all
ﬁrms act optimally except possibly a set of ﬁrms of measure zero.
Existence.–G is continuous and does not depend on τ. Put the topology of weak
convergence on τt. In this topology MS and MS×A are compact and, since D(.) is
continuous, u is continuous. The assumptions underlying Theorem 1 of Jovanovic
and Rosenthal (1988) hold and equilibrium exists.
Characterization.–Let us discuss the model informally in terms of this abstract
notation. The body of the paper takes the initial condition µ0 (1,−1) = N. I.e., all
ﬁrms start in the “other” sector. Entry at date t is just the number of ﬁrms that will
next period be in the state {2,0},
Z
S
G({2,0};s,a)dτt = τt ({1,−1,2})
9Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) had additional generality that we do not need here.
20which, given the restrictions on the feasibility of the transitions is the number of ﬁrms
that were in state σ =1and α = −1 that took the action a =2 . Exit at date t is the
number of ﬁrms that will at t+1be in the state {1,−1} that in the previous period







Since N is large, some ﬁrms always remain in the “other” sector, where they derive
the lifetime payoﬀ
vt (1,τ)=1 (14)






vt+1 (2,0) ≤ 1.
If demand increases with t, not all the entry necessarily happens at t =0any longer.
The entry set is
E =
½






vt+1 (2,0) = 1
¾
,
and since ut (2,τt)=0 , the exit set is
X = {t ∈ I+ | vt+1 (2,0) ≤ vt+1 (1,−1)}.
21